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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This matter comes within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2001). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Pursuant to Rule 24(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, White Water 
does not include a Statement of the Issues because it is satisfied with Newman's 
statement, with the following addition regarding the Standard of Review: "[W]hen the 
employee's activity is so clearly within or outside the scope of employment that 
reasonable minds cannot differ, the court may decide the issue as a matter of law." 
Christensen v. Swenson. 874 P.2d 125, 127 (Utah 1994). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
There are no determinative statutes or rules. The issues raised in this appeal are 
governed by case law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Pursuant to Rule 24(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, White Water 
does not include a Statement of the Case because it is satisfied with Newman's statement, 
with the following exceptions to Newman's Statement of Facts: 
(1) The recitation of Newman's disability and medical expenses is not only 
unsupported by appropriate citation to the record, it is irrelevant to the 
issues on appeal. 
1 
(2) Sundquist did not receive a percentage of each job "he worked on." He 
received a percentage of each job that he "installed." (R. 61, f 10; 78; 80, 
lines 7-16.) 
(3) There is no citation to the record in support of Newman's "fact" that 
Sundquist was compensated for transporting products, nor is there any basis 
in the record for this assertion. 
(4) Sundquist was not hauling White Water's products from a "job site." 
Sundquist was hauling products from his home at the time of the accident. 
(R. 98, f 11; 110; 121, lines 23-25; 122, lines 1-25.) 
In addition to the facts not excepted set forth in Newman's Statement of Facts, 
White Water adds the following Statement of the Facts: 
Sundquist was required to go to White Water's offices every day. (R. 99, f 19; 
110; 111, lines 9-11.) Once at White Water's office, Sundquist picked up his assignments 
for the day, completed paperwork, loaded materials for that day's work, and headed out to 
his various assignments. (R. 99, <H 20-21; 110; 111, lines 14-20.) He did not know at 
which job site he would work on a particular day until he went to White Water's offices 
in the morning to receive his assignments. (R. 100, f 33; 110; 123, lines 15-25; 128, lines 
12-14.) At the time of the accident, Sundquist was driving a truck that he owned and that 
he insured. (R. 99, <H 22, 25; 110; 111, lines 21-25; 112, lines 1-10.) Sundquist owned 
the trailer he was pulling. (R. 101, f 40; 133; 135, lines 15-17.) Other installers were 
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able to do their work without the use of a trailer, which was not required as part of 
Sundquist's employment. (R. 97, <j[ 7; 110; 128, lines 7-11; 133, 136, lines 2-8.) 
Sundquist owned his own tools and hauled them in his trailer. (R. 99, H 28, 31; 110; 
117, lines 14-22; 120, lines 21-23.) Sundquist commonly had materials in his trailer 
when he went home in the evening, and White Water was aware of this activity. (R. 100, 
fl[ 34, 39; 110; 124, lines 11-17; 139; 141, lines 20-23.) At the end of the work day, 
Sundquist never returned to White Water's offices; he always went home after his last 
job. (R. 100, f 37; 110; 129, lines 22-25;130, lines 1-9.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
At the time of the accident, Sundquist was commuting from home to work. His 
trip was personal in nature. The personal benefits to Sundquist heavily outweigh the mere 
benefit to, and lack of control by, White Water. As such, Sundquist was not in the course 
and scope of his employment per the coming and going rule and White Water cannot be 
vicariously liable for his negligence. The trial court was correct in granting summary 
judgment to White Water pursuant to the coming and going rule and its decision should 
be affirmed. 
No exception to the coming and going rule changes the outcome. There was no 
dual purpose involved, as Sundquist's primary motivation for the trip was to get to work 
as required to receive the day's assignments and materials. There was no personal detour 
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or errand, as Sundquist went home at the end of the day and was not on a temporary or 
slight deviation. 
Newman's reliance upon Anderson is misplaced. Anderson v. Gobea, 501 P.2d 
453, 457 (Ariz. App. 1972). Not only is this case from the Arizona Court of Appeals, but 
it is factually different from what we have here because the employer asked the employee 
to conduct a special errand, during which an accident occurred. On the other hand, White 
Water's reliance upon Ahlstrom is appropriate. Ahlstrom v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2002 
UT 4, 73 P.3d 315. It is the Utah Supreme Court case most on point. It sets forth the 
analysis of the coming and going rule under factual circumstances similar to those found 
here and holds that the coming and going rule applies. The fact that a later decision 
allowed the employee to collect workers' compensation benefits resulting from the same 
accident does not make Ahlstrom "precarious." Third party negligence cases are decided 
under a different standard of review than workers' compensation cases. 
Sundquist's commute is so outside the course and scope of his employment 
pursuant to the coming and going rule that reasonable minds could not differ. As such, it 
was appropriate for the trial court to grant White Water's motion for summary judgment 
as a matter of law and dismiss Newman's action against it. The trial court's decision 
should be affirmed. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE COMING AND GOING RULE ESTABLISHES THAT SUNDQUIST 
WAS NOT IN THE COURSE AND SCOPE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT AT 
THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT. 
It is undisputed that Sundquist was commuting from his home to his work at the 
time of the accident. He was traveling to the offices of his employer, White Water, in his 
own vehicle pulling his own trailer. Sundquist was required to check in each work day at 
White Water's offices to, among other things, pick up his assignments and materials for 
that day's work. Sundquist was doing what he did every work day: travel in his own 
vehicle to his place of employment. As such, he falls within the coming and going rule 
and was not in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident. 
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer can be held vicariously 
liable for the acts of its employee only if the employee was in the course and scope of his 
employment at the time of the act. Christensen, 874 P.2d at 127; Whitehead v. Variable 
Annuity Life Ins. Co.. 801 P.2d 934, 935 (Utah 1989). Generally, there are three criteria 
used to determine if an employee is in the course and scope of his employment. Birkner 
v. Salt Lake County. 771 P.2d 1053, 1056 (Utah 1989). The criteria are: (1) "an 
employee's conduct must be of the general kind the employee is employed to perform;" 
(2) "the employee's conduct must occur within the hours of the employee's work and the 
ordinary spatial boundaries of the employment;" and (3) "the employee's conduct must be 
motivated, at least in part, by the purpose of serving the employer's interest." IcL at 1057. 
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However, when an employee is traveling to or from work, he is generally not 
considered to be in the course and scope of his employment. "As a general rule, an 
employee is not acting within the course and scope of his employment when he is 
traveling in his own automobile to and from work." Whitehead, 801 P.2d at 935 
(citations omitted). This is known as the coming and going rule and it is applicable in 
third party negligence claims like the lawsuit here. Id at 936, 938. 
The rationale for the coming and going rule is sound. 
The major premise of the "going and coming" rule is that it is unfair to impose 
unlimited liability on an employer for conduct of its employees over which it has 
no control and from which it derives no benefit. 
Whitehead, 801 P.2d at 937. "Therefore, the major focus in determining whether or not 
the general rule should apply in a given case is on the benefit the employer receives and 
his control over the conduct." Id This is the focus because an employer is liable for its 
employee's negligence only if the employee is acting for the benefit of the employer and 
under the employer's control. Id Where an employer has no control over the employee's 
decision to commute to and from work, the route chosen, or the manner in which the 
employee drives his vehicle, the employer is not liable for the employee's negligence. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court case most on point is Ahlstrom. In that case, a police 
officer was involved in an accident while driving a city-owned marked police car from a 
mandatory work meeting to her home. Ahlstrom v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 2002 UT 4, f 2, 
73 P.3d 315. At the time of the accident, the officer was carrying certain items owned by 
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her employer. Id. She was required to monitor her employer's radio and respond to any 
emergency calls. Id The Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment to the injured plaintiffs, and in doing so held that, absent "unique 
circumstances," liability should not attach to an employer for the negligent acts of its 
employee when traveling to or from work, in accordance with the coming and going rule. 
Id at 113. 
In order to properly analyze the applicability of the coming and going rule, one 
must weigh the benefit to and control by the employer against the personal nature of the 
employee's trip to or from work. 
[Wjhere an employee engages in conduct benefitting the employer or which is 
controlled by the employer, we weigh the benefit and control against the personal 
nature of the trip in order to determine where it is appropriate to place liability. 
Ahlstrom. 2002 UT 4 at f 9. 
Typically, courts have adopted the methodology of dissecting the circumstances of 
the trip that resulted in the injury, assaying each for indicia of benefit, assigning 
the element of benefit to either the employer or the employee, and tallying up the 
final allocation of benefits. 
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Labor Commission, 2007 UT 4, f 20, 153 P.3d 179. If the 
benefits to the employer from the employee's trip to or from work are insufficient to "tip 
the balance" of benefits to the side of the employer, the coming and going rule applies 
and the employee is not in the course and scope of employment. Id. at f 21. In weighing 
the benefits, one must keep in mind that a "mere benefit" to the employer, or the exercise 
of "some control" "is not enough to overcome the general premises of the coming and 
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going rule." Ahlstromu 2002 UT 4 at f 8. Liability to the employer will not attach simply 
because "the employer derives any benefit or exercises any control over the conduct. . . ." 
IdLat<l[9. 
The personal nature of Sundquist's commute to work outweighs any mere benefit 
to White Water and the lack of control it exercised over Sundquist's conduct on the 
morning of the accident. Sundquist's travel was personal in nature and for his own 
personal benefit. In order to maintain his employment, he had to travel to and arrive at 
work. He had to do so to receive his assignments and materials so that he could install 
the products and receive payment on the installations. He was traveling in his own 
vehicle, which he insured, and was pulling his own trailer. Simply arriving at work is not 
a substantial benefit to an employer. Van Leeuwen v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 
901 P.2d 281, 285 (Utah App. 1995). It is personal in nature and benefits the employee. 
In addition, the fact that Sundquist was able to travel with his employer's unused 
materials in his trailer, along with his own tools, to his home at the end of the work day, 
instead of being required to return them that same day before returning home, is to the 
benefit of Sundquist, not White Water. He was able to get home earlier, with the obvious 
benefits associated therewith. It was common for Sundquist to take advantage of this 
opportunity, and to then return White Water's items when he traveled to work, as he was 
required to do every work day anyway. He was not a paid delivery driver, as suggested 
by Newman. Sundquist's job was to install White Water's products, and that is what he 
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was paid to do. His responsibilities did include transporting White Water's materials to 
and from job sites - so that he could install them. His responsibilities did not include 
transporting those materials to and from his home. 
In comparison, there is minimal benefit to White Water found in Sundquist's 
commute to work on the morning of the accident, and there is a complete lack of control 
over his conduct. The mere benefit to White Water is the return of its unused products 
and materials, which could have been done the night before. In addition, there is no 
evidence that White Water controlled any aspect of Sundquist's travel. It did not dictate 
Sundquist's route or how he drove. White Water did not choose the time for Sundquist's 
departure from home or whether or not he made any stops before arriving at work. Any 
argument that because Sundquist drove a truck and pulled a trailer to transport the 
materials shows White Water's control over his activities is misplaced. Sundquist could 
have chosen any number of means of transport. He was not required to use a trailer. 
White Water did not dictate the means of transport chosen and owned by Sundquist. In 
any event, when weighing the benefits the focus is on the particular trip involving the 
accident. Ahlstrom. 2002 UT 4 at f 9; Salt Lake Citv Corp.. 2007 UT 4 at f 20. White 
Water did not control Sundquist's conduct on any particular trip to or from work, 
including the one at issue. 
Also, Newman's suggestion that Sundquist would not have been traveling south on 
1-15 in his own vehicle if not for the fact that he was hauling White Water's products is 
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simply incorrect. Whether or not he had already returned the products the night before, 
he still had to travel the same route on 1-15 to report to work as required. 
If carrying items belonging to your employer was all that it took to get outside the 
coming and going rule, employers would be open to the unlimited liability against which 
the rule is designed to protect. Whitehead. 801 P.2d at 937. A school teacher grading 
papers at home at night and returning them the next morning would expose her employer 
to liability if she is in an accident. A plumber unable to install a sink before the end of 
the day might create vicarious liability for his employer if he goes straight home for 
dinner with the sink in his truck and then gets in an accident on the way back to the shop 
the next day. So it is here. Sundquist was merely traveling to work with some of his 
employer's products in his trailer. There is nothing unique about his circumstances. 
The personal nature of Sundquist's trip is not outweighed by the one fact that he 
was carrying some of his employer's products during his commute to work. In Ahlstrom. 
it was not enough to overcome the coming and going rule that the police officer traveled 
in a city-owned vehicle, carried numerous items owned by the city, and was required to 
use the vehicle and items off-duty if called upon. There is even less here in support of 
any argument against the application of the coming and going rule. "The conclusion that 
liability should not attach unless there are unique circumstances is in accord with the 
stated purposes of the coming and going rule . . . ." Ahlstrom, 2002 UT 4 at f 13. After 
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weighing and tallying the benefits, the scale tips heavily toward Sundquist. As a result, 
the coming and going rule applies. 
Therefore, because Sundquist was simply commuting to work in his own vehicle, 
he falls within the coming and going rule. As such, he was not in the course and scope of 
his employment at the time of the accident and the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment to White Water was proper and should be affirmed. 
II. THE DUAL PURPOSE RULE IS NOT APPLICABLE. 
Newman argues that, even if Sundquist was not in the course and scope of his 
employment pursuant to the coming and going rule, White Water should still be 
vicariously liable for his conduct under the dual purpose rule. The rule is not applicable, 
however, because Sundquist's purpose was primarily to benefit himself by getting to 
work to start another work day. 
The dual purpose rule is an exception to the coming and going rule. Ahlstrom, 
2002 UT 4 at 114. 
If an employee's personal conduct benefits an employer, we have implied that the 
employer may be held liable where the predominant purpose of the conduct was 
not personal. 
Id 
However, if the primary motivation for the employee's activity is personal, "even 
though there may be some transaction of business or performance of duty merely 
incidental or adjunctive thereto, the person should not be deemed to be in the 
scope of his employment." 
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Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort. 808 P.2d 1037, 1041 (Utah 1991) (quoting Whitehead. 
801 P.2d at 937 (quoting Martinson v. W-M Insurance Agency, Inc., 606 P.2d 256, 258 
(Utah 1980))). If an employee's trip to or from work is not predominantly motivated to 
benefit the employer, the dual purpose rule does not apply. Ahlstrom, 2002 UT 4 at f 15. 
If the benefits to the employer are only tangential to the employee's purpose of 
commuting to or from work, the dual purpose rule is inapplicable. Id "Such tangential 
benefits are not enough to result in respondeat superior liability for the [employer] under 
the dual purpose exception to the coming and going rule." Id. 
As set forth above in detail, Sundquist's predominant motivation for his commute 
was to get to work as required. That he carried with him some of White Water's 
materials is only a tangential benefit to White Water, but a substantial benefit to 
Sundquist. Newman's suggestion that there is no evidence that Sundquist's primary 
motivation was traveling to work, as opposed to transporting the materials, is inaccurate. 
Sundquist testified that he had to go to White Water's offices every work day to obtain 
his assignments and pick up his materials for that day. He also had to complete 
paperwork. The primary motivation for the trip was to report to work and receive the 
day's assignments, not to transport materials. 
Newman also relies upon a test set forth in Whitehead in support of his argument 
for the applicability of the dual purpose exception to the coming and going rule. 
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One useful test is whether the trip is one which would have required the employer 
to send another employee over the same route or to perform the same function if 
the trip had not been made. 
Whitehead, 801 P.2d at 937. However, Newman's reliance assumes that one of 
Sundquist's job duties was to transport White Water's products to and from his home. 
This was not one of his job duties. Instead, his duties included transporting the items to 
and from job sites for installation. Sundquist should not be able to create a dual purpose 
exception by taking materials home for his convenience when such conduct is outside the 
scope of his job duties. The fact that Sundquist took the products home to be returned the 
next day since he was going into work anyway "did not turn his daily commute into a trip 
primarily motivated by a business purpose, nor would [White Water] have needed to send 
someone else over the same route to accomplish any of its purposes." Id. White Water 
did not need the materials at Sundquist's home, nor did it request him to bring the items 
to his home. Sundquist could have simply returned the products to White Water's offices 
the night before, and then returned home for the evening. IcL It was merely incidental to 
White Water, but significantly beneficial to Sundquist, that he chose to take them home 
instead. Id Such a circumstance should not create a dual purpose so as to thwart the 
purposes of the coming and going rule. 
As such, the dual purpose rule does not create vicarious liability on the part of 
White Water for Sundquist's conduct. The coming and going rule applies and the trial 
court's ruling should be upheld. 
13 
III. SUNDQUIST WAS NOT ON A PERSONAL DETOUR; HE WENT HOME 
FOR THE EVENING. 
Newman suggests that White Water attempts to invoke a personal detour or 
personal errand rule. This is inaccurate. White Water does, however, argue that 
Sundquist was not in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident, 
as set forth above. It is accurate to say that Sundquist went home after his last assignment 
the night before the accident. He was not temporarily on a personal errand or personal 
detour, any more than any person could be considered on such a detour when they go 
home at night after work. 
Newman's reliance upon Clover is misplaced. In that case, a ski resort employee 
had taken a couple of ski runs in between his job duties managing restaurants at a ski 
resort. Clover, 808 P.2d at 1038. During the ski run back to work he was involved in an 
accident. Id. In reaching its decision, the court considered what the predominant 
motivation was for the ski run. Id at 1042. Newman also cites Burton in support. In that 
case, the employee simply stopped at the dentist for thirty (30) minutes during the work 
day. Burton v. La Duke. 210 P. 978, 980 (Utah 1922). After returning to work, the 
employee was involved in a car accident. Id, The court considered the "short visit" to the 
dentist and the "slight deviation" from the employee's direct route in determining that the 
employee had resumed his work duties. Id. at 981. 
Here, in contrast, Sundquist went home for the day. He was not making a short 
visit home for lunch, for example, nor was he making a slight deviation from his duties. 
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He was done for the day and went home. This is not the type of temporary personal 
detour or errand Clover and Burton analyzed. 
In situations where the detour was such a substantial diversion from the 
employee's duties that it constituted an abandonment of employment, we held that 
the employee, as a matter of law, was acting outside the scope of employment. 
Clover, 808 P.2d at 1042. Sundquist abandoned his work for the day and went home. He 
was in the course of commuting to work to resume his work responsibilities when the 
accident occurred. Any reference to a personal detour or errand is inapplicable to the 
circumstances found here and should not be the basis for overturning the trial court's 
decision in favor of the coming and going rule. 
IV. ANDERSON IS NOT CONTROLLING OR PERSUASIVE. 
Newman places much emphasis on Anderson in support of his arguments. In that 
case, the employee was asked by his employer to take a compressor mounted on a trailer 
home from a job site for safekeeping and to return it the next day. Anderson v. Gobea. 
501 P.2d 453, 457 (Ariz. App. 1972). The Arizona Court of Appeals found that the 
employee was in the course and scope of his employment and that, as such, his employer 
was liable for his negligence in an accident that occurred on the way back to the job site 
the next day. I d at 458-459. 
Newman's emphasis on this case is misplaced, and his interpretation of its holding 
is incorrect, for several reasons. First, this is a case from the Arizona Court of Appeals 
and is not controlling here. Second, it was decided approximately seventeen (17) years 
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prior to Whitehead, in which the coming and going rule was adopted for use in third party 
negligence cases. Whitehead, 801 P.2d at 936, 938. Third, the employee in Anderson 
was on a special errand requested by his employer, a fact omitted by Newman in his brief. 
The coming and going rule has an exception for a special errand requested by an 
employer. Ahlstrom, 2002 UT 4 at f 16. However, Newman does not invoke the special 
errand exception in this appeal. 
Even ignoring these issues, the facts supporting the decision in Anderson are not 
found here. In that case, the employee was specifically asked by his employer on this 
particular day to perform an activity that was different from his other activities. The 
employer controlled the employee's conduct in doing so and benefitted by the employee's 
actions. In contrast, Sundquist was merely doing what he commonly did when he had his 
employer's products with him while commuting to work. No special request was made of 
Sundquist by White Water on that particular day. Anderson is distinguishable on its facts 
and should not be relied upon to overrule the trial court's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of White Water. 
V. AHLSTROM IS APPLICABLE AND CONTROLLING. 
As set forth above, Ahlstrom is the case most on point with this matter. Ahlstrom 
v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2002 UT 4, f 2, 73 P.3d 315. Newman argues that it is not 
applicable because of certain factual distinctions. In fact, if there are any distinctions, 
they tend to favor the applicability of the coming and going rule in this case. 
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Newman suggests several times in his brief that because Sundquist was paid a 
percentage for each job that he somehow was being paid for his travel in transporting 
White Water's materials to and from job sites. Newman does not, however, provide any 
reference to the record in support of this contention nor does he cite any case law wherein 
an employee paid on a percentage was considered in the course and scope of employment 
in an analysis of the coming and going rule. The fact is, Sundquist was paid for the 
installation of the products, not the transportation thereof. Without installation, there 
would be no payment. In any event, Newman's point on payment for travel is misplaced. 
The police officer in Ahlstrom was not paid for her travel time. There is no evidence that 
Sundquist was paid for his travel time, and certainly no evidence he was paid for his 
commute to and from work. 
In addition, Newman attempts to draw a distinction between the size and types of 
items carried by the officer in Ahlstrom and the materials being carried by Sundquist 
during his commute. While it is true that a few of the products carried by Sundquist were 
probably larger than those carried by the officer, and that a few of the materials were sold 
to customers and to be installed at a later date, Newman fails to cite to any case law 
wherein such distinctions removed an employee's conduct from the coming and going 
rule. Also, the officer's radio, gun, sirens, lights, and the like were not merely 
"incidentals," but were the tools by which she performed her employment duties. The 
same can be said for the tools and products carried by Sundquist. 
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Finally, Newman argues that Ahlstrom is "precarious" because the Utah Supreme 
Court held that, for purposes of workers' compensation benefits for the officer, she was in 
the course and scope of her employment and that the coming and going rule did not apply. 
Salt Lake City Corp.. 2007 UT 4 at f[ 23-24. In fact, there is nothing "precarious" about 
Ahlstrom. There are different standards of review when considering the scope and course 
of employment in third party liability cases and workers' compensation cases. Id. at f 18. 
Our obligation to adopt an employee-friendly perspective on scope-of-employment 
cases from the Commission highlights the material difference between this case 
and the earlier case involving this accident, Ahlstrom v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2002 
UT 4, 73 P.3d 315. Unlike [the officer's] quest for benefits, the Ahlstrom 
plaintiffs were not entitled to a sympathetic application of the going and coming 
rule in aid of their effort to make Salt Lake City vicariously liable for [the 
officer's] negligence. Thus, the elements of the take-a-car-home program that 
were insufficient to render [the officer] an employee for the purpose of Salt Lake 
City's vicarious liability were nevertheless adequate to make [the officer] eligible 
to receive workers' compensation benefits. 
Id. at f 17. While the allocation of benefits standard, as set forth above, is applicable in 
negligence cases, it is not in workers' compensation cases. Id. at f 23. "[W]e have long 
indicated that the benefit to an employer need not be predominant over those of an 
employee before the employee becomes eligible for workers' compensation benefits." IdL 
The focus in workers' compensation cases, instead, is whether or not the employer 
derived "sufficient" benefits from the employee such that the employee's injury arose out 
of the course and scope of her employment. Id. at ff 24-25. 
The fact that there are different outcomes in the third party negligence and 
workers' compensation claims for the same accident underlying Ahlstrom does not make 
18 
its decision "precarious." It is the natural result of the different standards applied, as set 
forth in the decision in Salt Lake City Corp.. 2007 UT 4, <H 23-24. 
Ahlstrom is applicable and is controlling. As such, the trial court's reliance upon it 
was appropriate and its decision should be affirmed. 
VI. REASONABLE MINDS COULD NOT DIFFER. 
No reasonable mind could find that Sundquist was in the course and scope of his 
employment. He was traveling to work as he did every day to receive his day's 
assignments and to retrieve the necessary materials. He drove his own truck pulling his 
own trailer. He chose when to leave for work and the route to be taken. He chose the 
means of transport. He would have traveled the same route to work regardless of what he 
carried, or if he carried nothing. He was not paid for his travel time or his commute. 
While Sundquist did carry some of White Water's products, this was at his choice, for his 
benefit, and merely incidental to his commute. He commonly did this. His job duties did 
not include transporting products to his home. There was nothing unusual about this trip, 
nor did his employer make any special requests of him. 
Given the personal nature of Sundquist's commute, and the fact that the benefits to 
him for the trip are not outweighed by the mere benefit to White Water of the return of 
products (and the fact that it did not control his conduct), the coming and going rule 
applies and, as such, Sundquist was not in the course and scope of his employment at the 
time of the accident. "[W]hen the employee's activity is so clearly within or outside the 
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scope of employment that reasonable minds cannot differ, the court may decide the issue 
as a matter of law." Christensen, 874 P.2d at 127. Because reasonable minds cannot 
differ, the trial court was correct in granting White Water's motion for summary 
judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Sundquist was simply commuting to work at the time of his accident with 
Newman. Pursuant to the coming and going rule, he was not in the course and scope of 
his employment. The facts weigh so heavily in favor of the coming and going rule that no 
reasonable mind could differ. As such, the trial court was correct in granting White 
Water's motion for summary judgment dismissing Newman's claims against it as a matter 
of law. The trial court's decision should be affirmed. 
ADDENDUM 
No addendum is required and appellee refers the Court to appellant's addendum. 
DATED this of April, 2007. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Robert W. Thompson 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
006205-0427\RWT\127260.wpd 
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